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ABSTRACT 
 
Loss of control in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) is the most common cause of 
fatal accidents involving light aircraft in the UK and probably worldwide.   Understanding 
why LoC events occur and why there are apparent differences between aircraft types is 
currently under investigation by Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory (BFSL). 
 
Using a case study approach for selected light aircraft used in the training environment 
and based upon a 29 year study of UK fatal accidents, BFSL undertook a qualitative and 
quantitative review of fatal stall/spin accidents using a combination of statistical and 
qualitative analysis.   Aircraft/model design differences and published material were 
reviewed with respect to performance and handling qualities for possible clues, and 
informal interviews were conducted with type-experienced students, pilots and flying 
instructors. 
A flight test programme was executed using multiple examples (for fleet-wide attributes) 
of aircraft models to enable assessment and comparison of flying qualities (both 
qualitatively and quantitatively).  Working within the continuous budget constraints of 
academia, a creative and cost effective flight test programme was developed without 
compromising safety.   The two-man team (TP & FTE) used standard (unmodified) flying 
club and syndicate aircraft in conjunction with non-invasive low cost flight test 
instrumentation.   Tests included apparent longitudinal (static and dynamic) stability and 
control characteristics, stall and low-speed handling characteristics and cockpit 
ergonomics / pilot workload.  During this programme, adaptations were also made to the 
classic Cooper-Harper “point tracking” method towards a “boundary avoidance” method. 
 
The paper describes tools and techniques used, research findings, the team‟s lessons 
learned and proposed future research.   It also discusses the possible application of 
research results in aircraft, pilot and environmental causal factors, enabling a better 
understanding of LoC incidents and future avoidance within the light aircraft community. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
Symbol Meaning 
BFSL Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory 
CAA United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority 
CAS Calibrated Airspeed 
CG Centre of Gravity 
CHR Cooper-Harper Handling Quality Ratings 
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder 
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain 
FCMC  Flight Control Mechanical Characteristics 
FDR Flight Data Recorder 
FTE Flight Test Engineer 
GASCo General Aviation Safety Council 
IAS Indicated Airspeed 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
KCAS Knots Calibrated Air Speed 
LoC Loss of Control (in this paper, referring to in-flight, low speed, loss of 
control) 
LSS Longitudinal Static Stability 
MAC Mean Aerodynamic Chord 
MTOW Maximum Take-Off Weight 
PFtS Pull Force to Stall 
PiC Pilot in Command 
PiL Pilot in the Loop 
TP Test Pilot 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
Vstall Stall speed  
VSO Stall speed in the landing configuration 
W&CG Weight and Balance 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A recent survey carried out by GASCo [1] for the period 1980 to 2008 (Figure 1), showed 
that for fixed wing aeroplanes with MTOW 994-12,569lb (450-5,700kg),Loss of Control 
(LoC) in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) was a factor in 25% of all fatal 
accidents with a further 8% involved LoC in IMC conditions.   Low flying, aerobatics and 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) the next two highest causal categories of 16% and 
12% respectively, also involve low speed in-flight LoC to some degree.   The net result is 
that low speed LoC probably accounts for around 50% of all light aviation fatal accidents 
in the United Kingdom, and most likely for the rest of the world also. 
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Figure 1, Causes in UK GA fatal accidents, 1980-2008 
 
This understanding has led to a research project at Brunel University to understand 
some aspects of this, in particular the causes of low speed in-flight  LoC (the classic 
stall, or stall/spin accident). 
 
This research has created an understanding[2] that in considering departures from 
controlled flight, the classic flight test approach of measuring the pilot-aeroplane-
combination‟s ability to maintain an optimal condition is much less interesting than the 
means of measuring the system‟s ability to avoid crossing whatever boundary marks the 
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transition into loss of control.  This is illustrated by 
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1.2 VStall
1.1 VStall
Point 
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Boundary 
Avoidance
(Avoid)
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79 (Unaccept.)
10+ Control lost
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‘Top-down’
‘Bottom-up’@crossover switch from ‘top-down’  (point 
tracking) to ‘bottom-up’  
(boundary avoidance)
 
Figure 2 below which indicates the typical task of maintaining an initial speed of 1.3Vstall 
during an initial climb after a take-off or go-around.  The task might classically be 
examined in flight test by constructing a Cooper-Harper task[3] such as maintain 
1.3Vstall ±2 knots (desirable) / ±5 knots (adequate); however, as constructed this tells us 
little about stall avoidance.  Another approach, and that is one adopted by this team, is to 
set the satisfactory (CHR 13) at the ability to keep the aeroplane above 1.2Vs, 
unsatisfactory (CHR 46) at the ability to keep the aeroplane above 1.1Vstall, 
unacceptable (CHR 79) at below 1.1Vstall but above the stall; the stall itself, clearly a 
loss of control, then being CHR10.  This approach to handling qualities assessment has 
been termed Boundary Avoidance differentiating it from the more conventional Point 
Tracking handling qualities task.  The concept originates at the USAF Test Pilot 
School[4, 5], but has been adapted by Brunel University [6]. 
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Figure 2, Illustration of speed control during an aeroplane's initial climb after take-off 
 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CESSNA 150 AND CESSNA 152 
 
Probably the most common training aeroplanes in the world, the Cessna 150 and 152 
represent a family of 2-seat single engine high wing tractor monoplanes which feature 
somewhere in the logbooks of a large majority of the world‟s pilots.  This study has 
concentrated upon three models: the C150L, C150M and C152 (including French Reims-
Cessna built F150L, F150M and C152 models) which are summarised in Figure 3 below. 
 
 C150L and C150M C152 
Powerplant Continental, generating 100hp at 
2750rpm 
Lycoming, generating 110hp at 
2550rpm 
 
 
 
Propeller McAuley Standard McAuley Gull Wing 
MTOW 1600 lbf 1670 lbf 
CG Range 31.5-35” 
(19.9-30.1%MAC) 
31-36.5” 
(19.1 – 28.4 %MAC) 
Flap Range 0-40° 0-30° 
Flap 
mechanisation 
2 way switch, variable 
spring/latch characteristics.  No 
détentes. 
 
4 position gated switch. , Détentes 
at 0/10/20/30°. 
 
Indicator adjacent to switch 
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 C150L and C150M C152 
Indicator in left hand door pillar. 
 
 
 
 
 
VSO, CAS 42 knots 41 knots 
VSO, IAS 31 knots (35 mph) 41 knots 
Figure 3, Characteristics of C150L, C150M and C152 
 
These relatively small differences between the aeroplanes models becomes particularly 
interesting when considering the safety records of the aeroplanes (grouping all C152s 
together, and all C150s together), which can be analysed readily because the UK 
practices both open accident reporting, and central collation of all civil aeroplanes‟ flying 
hours.  For certified single engine aeroplanes with an MTOW above 600kgf (1323lbf), 
the GASCo study [1] shows a rate of 0.37 stall-related fatal accidents per 100,000 flying 
hours, (0.45 per 100,000 for all certified single engined aeroplanes), compared to 0.71 
for all Cessna 150s, or 0.04 for all Cessna 152s.  So, the C150 shows a stall related fatal 
accident rate about double the background population, whilst the C152 shows an order 
of magnitude better – and comparing the two, the C150 shows a stall related fatal 
accident rate around 17 times that for the C152.  As a research problem, this is 
particularly interesting because the reasons for these differences must presumably lie 
somewhere in the relatively small number of design differences between the aeroplanes. 
 
It was therefore decided to conduct a study – initially analytical but subsequently 
involving flight testing and simulator testing, comparing the characteristics of the two 
aeroplane families.  On analysis the differences between non-aerobatic C152 models 
are small so these were treated as identical, but of the C150 models the F150L and 
F150M were of greatest interest since these were the aeroplanes in most of the UK‟s 
fatal accidents.  This was only 10 fatal accidents – a small number but large enough to 
consider some analysis, a simple form of which is shown below in Figure 4, although the 
small number also necessitated considerable qualitative analysis also. 
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 Number of occurrences 
Wind above 
30 knots 
4 / 10       
2 persons 
on board 
5 / 10      
Instructor on 
board 
3 / 10        
Cessna 150 
L or M 
9 / 10  
Cessna 150 
A K 
0          
Cessna 152 1/10          
Go-around 
manoeuvre 
4/10       
Figure 4, Illustration of significant factors in UK C150/C152 fatal stall related accidents 
 
 
It is not readily possible to compare these numbers to “normal” training aeroplane 
operations but intuitively it seems reasonable to assume that for an inexpensive 2-seat 
aeroplane approved for flying training, 2PoB on 50% of flights, and an instructor on 
board for 30% of flights is probably typical of flying club operations – therefore this 
seems to say nothing important.  That the total wind was above 30 knots in 40% of 
cases, seems not unsurprising given that this is for fatal accidents and that the landing 
crosswind limit for the C150 is 15 knots (12 knots for the C152) and the stall speed about 
42 knots ; this therefore was not explored further but it is noted that conventional advice 
[7] is that flying light aeroplanes is inadvisable if the total wind exceeds 2/3 of stall speed 
– in this case that would be above 28 knots; the accident rate certainly does not lead one 
to suggest that this advice is wrong. 
 
However, the large disparity of types (equating to a 17:1 difference when standardised 
by flying hours), and that 40% of these accidents are during a go-around (baulked 
landing) did seem to be significant.  Thus the assumption became that there must be 
some differences which makes the C152 more safe in low speed handling than the 
C150, and that the go-around is representative of manoeuvres where a stall related fatal 
accident may occur. 
 
 
EQUIPMENT USED 
 
The aircraft have already been described, but the test equipment is clearly paramount to 
any understanding of a programme.  In this case, all test equipment had to be portable 
and not affect the certification state of the aeroplanes – which were invariably hired by 
the hour from flying training schools in various parts of England. 
 
Reliance upon traditional handheld equipment: the ruler, stopwatch, spring balance force 
gauge and kneeboard mounted test cards were considerable.  Situational awareness 
was substantially aided: freeing pilot capacity to concentrate upon the testing task, by 
use of a portable GPS – in this case a Garmin GPSMAP 296, which was found to be an 
excellent tool. 
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Cockpit video was provided by a Go-Pro Hero wide-lens self contained video camera, 
with a mass of 150 grammes and the ability to record 2½ hours of video onto an SD card 
without needing an external power supply.  This was useful for debriefs, but did not 
necessarily provide significant additional information for detailed flight test data analysis.  
As the authors had found on previous test programmes, the largest problem with such a 
camera was that the camera coped poorly with the high light level contrast between the 
cockpit interior (particularly instruments) and the outside view.  This was mostly resolved 
by positioning it to avoid more than peripheral outside view, thus giving a reasonably 
useable view of cockpit instruments and the pilot and FTE‟s actions within the cockpit. 
 
Of considerable benefit, and flown on most sorties was a self contained Appareo 
GAU1000A[8] flight data recorder, used with Appareo‟s proprietary AS Flight analysis 
software – often with subsequent analysis and/or presentation through either Microsoft 
Excel or Google Earth.  This was a very useful and inexpensive facility which provided 
adequate quality inertial and positional data at about 4Hz – although it has its 
deficiencies: rapid motion tended to be amplified (e.g. 45° wing drop at the stall 
appeared to be around 65°) and experience on other programmes has shown that it is 
unreliable during aerobatic manoeuvring; additionally the barometric sensor within the 
system does not function and it was only possible to use GPS derived geopotential 
altitude.  The system could be installed into any aeroplane in about 15 minutes, although 
it was helpful to have access to the aeroplane‟s electrical power supply, since the unit‟s 
own internal batteries did not have capacity for longer sorties flown.  Cross-calibration of 
the recorder against the embedded flight test instrumentation on Cranfield University‟s 
National Flying Laboratory Centre (NFLC) Jetstream aircraft showed very good 
correlation. 
 
A simple MP3 recorder, connected to a tie-clip microphone in one of the crew‟s headsets 
provided adequate cockpit voice recording capability, and with a little effort this could 
then be readily synchronised with both data from the flight data recorder, and from the 
cockpit camera.  (In later simulator tests, it could also be synchronised with a heart rate 
monitor.) 
 
 
CONSTRUCTING AND EXECUTING THE TEST PROGRAMME 
 
Flight Testing 
 
The main area of interest being low speed handling, and in particular stall avoidance, it 
was nonetheless clearly necessary to consider substantially the aeroplane performance 
and handling as it might affect low speed handling; but, it was anticipated that once initial 
testing had been carried out, the area of interest would probably narrow.  So a carefully 
flexible test plan was prepared which covered apparent longitudinal static stability (LSS), 
all dynamic modes, climb and cruise performance, and stalling at the range of conditions 
permitted by the aeroplanes‟ operating manuals.  All testing was to be carried out within 
those conditions, and without going outside the conditions of each aeroplane‟s 
Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA). 
 
Planning was for use of equipment as shown above, and with early flying for a 2-man 
crew of Test Pilot plus Flight Test Engineer, with the latter then having primary 
responsible for data recording, which was often manual.  It was originally anticipated that 
flying should be carried out approximately 50/50 solo and 2-up, but in practice it was 
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found that the data acquisition and test flying efficiency benefits of flying 2-up were such 
that solo flight was kept to a minimum.  From the start, the use of Cooper-Harper 
handling qualities ratings was planned for substantially since it was anticipated, correctly, 
that pilot‟s opinion of ease of airspeed maintenance and boundary avoidance would be 
of fundamental importance. 
 
Despite all flight being within Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) conditions, a 
conventional flight test safety assessment was carried out, which rated this flying as of 
medium risk, particularly because of the amount of stalling planned (with associated risk 
of inadvertent spin) but with this ameliorated by staying within certified flight limits, by 
Test Pilot workup including stall/spin refresher training, and by ensuring adequate height 
for all manoeuvres.  This last was on occasion a cause for conflict with aircraft owners, 
who could for example not understand why with a 2,500ft cloudbase – which for most of 
their purposes would have been perfectly suitable for revenue earning flight, the test 
team declined to accept the aircraft, when their planning for aft CG stalling requiring a 
substantially greater cloudbase.  One inadvertent spin (from a stall test in an F150L), 
from safe height and with a satisfactory recovery, justified this caution and it was found 
that so long as the test team was continuous and open in its explanation of test conduct 
and objectives, these problems were minimal. 
 
With progress, the test programme came to concentrate upon apparent longitudinal 
static stability and cockpit workload during speed tasks.  The eventual number of sorties 
is shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 5, Test Programme Flown (Totalling 17 test sorties and 3 checkouts, in 8 airframes: 
comprising 25:35 flying time) 
 
The test organisation did not own any aircraft assets, but in any case it was decided after 
initially developing a good understanding of aircraft behaviour that it was important to 
obtain parallel results of the critical aspects for a range of airframes so that they could be 
compared.  This required relationships to be developed with a number of different 
owning and renting organisations who were generally very helpful with regard to the test 
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teams aims and objectives, and also prepared in most cases to avoid otherwise 
expensive and repetitive requirements for pre-rental checkouts of the Test Pilot, who had 
57 hrs flying time on single engined Cessnas at the start of the programme.  On one 
occasion, after quizzing the test team on their work and ongoing findings, a flying school 
even changed their own training practices on the types. 
 
 
SIMULATOR TESTING 
 
Flight test results indicated that differences in the performance and handling 
qualities of the two case study aircraft maybe due to different stick force 
gradients in the pitch axis.   These differences potentially impact the low-speed 
handling qualities and may be related to the different fatal stall/spin accident 
rates during the take-off, climbout, approach & landing, go-around phases of 
flight and during forced landings.   A simulation test programme was devised to 
gather additional research data in a controlled environment with volunteer pilots. 
The tests were design to assess point tracking & boundary avoidance during 
simulated potential, LoC scenarios using a selection of stick force gradients and 
also to assess pilot workload. 
 
 
Flight Simulation Equipment 
 
Early use of Brunel University‟s Merlin MP521 engineering flight simulator 
showed that there was a very strong need for fine resolution, small breakout, 
friction and freeplay values, and reconfigurable control force gradients in a 
simulator for it to have any value in handling qualities research. 
 
A nationwide search of suitable low-cost simulation facilities within the academic 
environment identified a facility at Sheffield University for the simulation tests.   
The fixed-base engineering flight simulator offered precision control loading in a 
wide-screen, 150 degree HFOV by 40 degree VFOV suitable for circuit-based 
flying scenarios.   The simulator uses a PC7 cockpit with basic instrument panel, 
control stick, pedals, brakes, flaps and elevator trim.   This system allows stick 
force gradients to be software configured.   A portable heart rate monitor was 
also used to gather additional data during the tests together with cockpit CVR, 
video and intercom for simulated radio communications.  
 
 
Constructing and Executing the Simulation Test Programme 
 
A flight simulation test programme was developed to determining reasons for 
different trends towards low level departures from controlled flight in various 
general aviation aeroplanes.   The flight simulation test programme involved 26 
(becoming 20 for later tests) volunteer general aviation pilots with a variety of 
experience from 35 to 12,000+ PiC hours (median 222 hours).   Each pilot 
conducted 5 different flying scenarios using 3 programmed stick force gradients 
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(high/medium/low).   After completing a practice familiarisation circuit, pilots 
conducted a circuit, baulked landing/go-around, base to finals turn, take-off and 
climb-out and EFATO.   The sequence of stick force gradients was cycled to 
minimise effects of task familiarisation as tests progressed.   Simulated 
Air/Ground radio communications were used for all scenarios with all pilots 
required to make the radio calls as necessary for flight in the pattern/circuit.   On 
completion of each scenario, NASA-TLX[9] workload assessment (un-weighted) 
was used to gauge pilot opinion based on a simple rating scale of 1~10.   Pilots 
were asked to rate mental workload, physical workload, time pressures, their own 
performance, effort required and frustration with respect to each task.   Each 
participant was required to wear a heart rate monitor from pre-flight briefing 
through to completion of all exercises and post-flight de-brief.   A full simulator 
data-log was captured for each test scenario at a rate of 5 Hz.   Control inputs 
and flight data parameters were recorded against a common synchronised 
timeline with CVR, camera & simulator.   The use of simulator data together with 
NASA-TLX afforded both qualitative and qualitative research data for subsequent 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS OF FLIGHT TESTING 
 
Whilst a great deal of data was obtained, it became clear that this investigation needed t 
become essentially one into apparent Longitudinal Static Stability (LSS).  Stick fixed 
apparent LSS (stick force per airspeed change) on all the aeroplanes tested, in all 
configurations, was low – consistently below for example the 6 knots per lb which is 
required by part 25.173 [10, 11], which is the only civil airworthiness standard to define 
stick force gradient requirements quantitatively. 
 
However, there was also considerable variation between aeroplanes, and with 
configuration.  Consider firstly Figure 6 ; this shows the stick force gradient per airspeed 
change in the cruise configuration – the C152 nearly meets the recommendation for 10lb  
/4.45daN) stick force to stall made by Ellis [12], whilst no other variant comes close – at 
3daN for the F150L and 1.7daN for both the F150M and a C150G which was also tested 
– all of these at mid CG (in practice, anything aft of mid-range is almost unachievable in 
all of these aircraft due to design geometry and loading limits, so this represents a 
realistic worst case in real operations). 
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Figure 6, Stick Fixed Apparent LSS in cruise configuration: various Cessna models 
(Vertical line shows stall speed, horizontal line 10lbf, FCMC have been manually removed 
from data to give the apparence of no freeplay or friction) 
 
 
However, as is commonly the case, the selection of flap was longitudinally destabilising, 
as illustrated in Figure 7 below; this shows apparent LSS with 30° of flap selected (the 
maximum for the C152 models, and 10° below the maximum for the C150 models).  In 
this case the C152 remains the least-worst aeroplane, requiring about 1.4daN (one third 
of Ellis‟ proposed minimum) back stick to stall, which coincided with the F150L.  The 40° 
flap case could not be evaluated quantitatively as C150 aircraft invariably had effectively 
neutral or slightly divergent apparent longitudinal stability characteristics with 40° of flap 
and any power setting representative of a normal or shallow approach. 
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Polynomial Curve Fit for Apparent LSS - Landing (30)
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Figure 7, Stick Fixed Apparent LSS in land (30) configuration: various Cessna models 
(vertical line shows stall speed, horizontal line shows 10lbf, FCMC have been manually 
removed from data to give the apparence of no freeplay or friction) 
 
The use of Cooper-Harper tasks was used relative to avoidance of the stall was primarily 
evaluated by use of Test Pilot opinion, for example the following is from the post flight 
report of a C152 mid-aft CG sortie: 
 
Rotation was achieved at the targeted 50KIAS [52KCAS] (±2KIAS, HQR2) and 
then the aircraft naturally unstuck at about 57KIAS [58KCAS] without any 
particular difficulty maintaining the runway centreline through the ground roll.  
The targeted screen height of 67KIAS [66KCAS] was also achieved (not below 
49KIAS[51KCAS]/1.2Vs, HQR2) without significant difficulty this being 
approximately the speed achieved with the take-off trim setting.  Initial climb was 
similarly achieved at the same speed and with the same ease (not below 
49KIAS/1.2Vs, HQR2), and the flaps were retracted at about 200ft with a single 
operation of the gated flap lever…  [G-BOFL, 11 March 2009] 
 
The ability to track speeds was also evaluated, firstly by comparing the ability to 
accurately track an airspeed using the conventional Cooper-Harper method [3], using 
limits of ±2 knots for the satisfactory-without-improvement 13 band, and ±5 knots for 
the warrant-improvement band.  This is shown below in Figure 8; this clearly illustrates 
that whilst G-BFLU,  a C-152 showed good scores in the range 2-3, G-BCUH, an F150M 
showed poorer scores of about 5 – indicating that the aeroplane could be improved in 
this capacity. 
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Figure 8, Classical Cooper Harper Scores for steady climb in C150 and C152 aircraft at 
best climb speed and full power, cruise configuration. 
 
These data illustrate the general picture: clearly a great deal more data are available, but 
the story is consistent.  Specifically: 
 
- No variant of C152 or C150 tested exceeds Ellis‟ recommendations for 10lbf stick 
force to stall, although in cruise configuration, the C152 just meets the 
recommendation.  C150 variants routinely demonstrate a force to stall of 2/3 or 
less in the cruise configuration. 
- No variant of C152 or C150 tested, with 30° of flaps (a typical landing 
configuration in either aeroplane) selected shows a large stick force to stall which 
might provide good warning.  The best aircraft show a stick force of about 1 daN 
(2.2lbf) to stall, whilst the worst about 0.2daN (0.4lbf) to stall. 
- No C150 variant flown, with 40° of flaps selected, showed a stick force to stall 
sufficiently large that it could be measured with the handheld instrumentation in 
use (the instrument in use could be resolved to 0.1daN / ¼lbf). 
- Pilot opinion consistently showed large (4+) Cooper Harper ratings for speed 
holding, or stall avoidance, tasks where flaps were selected at climb power (an 
initial go-around case) in C150 variants. 
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RESULTS OF SIMULATOR TESTING 
 
Analysis of the flight simulator data output for the climb-out by two volunteer pilots is 
presented in Figure 9 and Figure 10 below.   The results for non-dimensionalised alpha 
versus non-dimensionalised elevator deflection consistently show that high stick force 
gradients have a smaller ‘footprint’ than both medium and low stick force gradients for a 
representative sample of GA pilots.   Elevator deflection was initially in the ‘pull’ sense 
for high stick forces, moving to almost neutral and then to a ‘push’ sense for low stick 
force measurement.   High stick forces exhibited less alpha and airspeed variation in all 
cases.   All results highlight that increased elevator stick movement is required for the 
medium and low stick force gradients, with the medium stick force gradient apparently 
performing worst of all.   The results also indicate differences between a typical medium 
hour private pilot (pilot 23) and a high hours professional pilot (pilot 24).   For identical 
tasks the high hours professional pilot consistently applied much smaller control inputs 
and achieved a more precise result, however, even the high hours pilot experienced a 
degradation in precision as the stick forces were reduced.   Pilots were observed to 
make less use of the elevator trim with low and medum stick force gradents.  Variability 
in piloting technique was also observed during the tests. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9, Non-dimensionalised AoA versus elevator position for high experience pilot 
executing climb-out 
 
 
41st International SFTE Symposium, 13-16 September 2010, Washington DC, USA. 
 16 
 
Figure 10, Non-dimensionalised AoA versus elevator position for medium experience pilot 
executing climb-out 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Figure 11, Illustration of pilot workload through prior flight from simulator results 
 
Figure 11, shows the variation of pilot workload from an earlier group of experiments to 
examine the variation of workload with phase of flight.  The results show that for an 
optimally aroused, current, fit & healthy, well-trained and rested pilot, pilot capacity 
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gradually decreases over time.   Pilot workload increases with task complexity (e.g. re-
configuration resulting in power, flap and hence trim changes).   The take-off & climb-out 
and approach & landing result in higher workload than cruising fight.  „Safety margin‟ is 
represented by the difference between pilot capacity and pilot workload.   The „safety 
margin‟ decreases in safety-critical high workload phases of flight such as the takeoff & 
climb-out and approach & landing. 
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Figure 12, Illustration of pilot mental demand through flight from simulator results 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the recorded mean pilot mental workload during a practice circuit, 
circuit, approach and landing with baulked landing and base to finals turn for all three 
stick force gradients (high ~0.0666 daN/kn, equating to about 4½lb to stall, medium 
~0.03 daN/kn, low ~0.006 daN/kn).   Although there are local discrepancies, in general, 
the results show increased mental workload for both medium and low stick force 
gradients compared to high. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LOSS OF CONTROL 
 
It was concluded from this work that avoidance of low speed in-flight loss of control (LoC, 
or stall) is primarily about preventing the pilot-aeroplane combination from crossing the 
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high AoA / low speed boundary which defines the stall.  Providing the pilot with the ability 
to avoid this, requires good cues, and also a sufficiently low workload that they can 
perceive these cues.  Whilst this itself should be fairly self evident, this study has also 
shown that all else remaining unchanged, in such low performance aeroplanes designed 
for student and private pilots, pitch control forces are very significant in helping a pilot 
avoid the stall, with higher control force gradients providing better avoidance. 
 
With regard to the particular aeroplanes, it was also the view of the researchers that the 
Cessna 150 and Cessna 152 aeroplanes should be regarded as separate types with 
conversion training in either direction – but particularly when a pilot goes from the 
Cessna 152 to the Cessna 150, which has poorer flap mechanisation and lower control 
force gradients.  This is a reflection of the fact that when Cessna developed the C150 
into the C152, they clearly made significant safety improvements to the design with 
regard to cockpit ergonomics, performance and pitch control. 
 
When comparing these aeroplanes to certification standards, it became the opinion of 
the researchers that most standards leave the issue of pitch control forces, particularly 
approaching the stall, are too poorly defined making it possible for aeroplanes with very 
little control force based low speed warning to become certified on the basis of 
subjective opinion.  The Cessna 152, which has low control forces but a very good safety 
record has pull forces to stall of 4.2 daN (9lbf) in cruise configuration, or 1.4daN (3lbf) in 
landing configuration.  These might therefore be a good starting point for any future 
requirement for a minimum pull force to stall (PFtS).  The research team have also found 
the use of human factors tools – traditional cockpit assessment and the Cooper Harper 
Rating (CHR) scale very beneficial in this assessment, and they should almost certainly 
be useful to other assessment teams, as of-course they have been in the past. 
 
Further work is required, and some of this will be done by the authors in their continued 
flight safety research.  In particular further investigation of how pilots can be made aware 
of the implications of the stalling characteristics of their particular aeroplane, perhaps 
with reference to historical standards, and also with regard to how to incorporate the 
Flight Control Mechanical Characteristics (FCMC) in LSS models. 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED IN CONDUCTING THE TEST PROGRAMME 
 
This was an unusual test programme – conducted using non-dedicated, non-owned flight 
test resources within flying schools.  In particular, all management of non-standard 
equipment must remain fully with the test team, who must be sufficiently current in its 
use to be able to fit and remove it, as well as conduct flight test sorties, within the 
standard flying school 2-hour “slot”.  Maintenance standards were variable, and the test 
team also had to be particularly diligent in their go/no-go serviceability decisions, as well 
as always checking (back to the calculations from empty aircraft wheel-weights) all 
weight and balance reports, which routinely contained errors. 
 
Workup, with multiple test resources spread across different airfields and organisations, 
needed managing very carefully.  Sharing information about the programme, Test Pilot 
recency, and workup flying with aircraft owners helped considerably, but it also rested 
with the flight test team to both ensure adequate recency and type knowledge, and to 
take advantage of increasing recency to obtain greater testing efficiency. 
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It was necessary to start with a relatively general test programme, covering much more 
information than would be eventually needed.  In doing so, it was important to 
continuously review test results, so as to narrow into the tests that would become 
genuinely important to the research conclusions.  It is, of-course, never good practice to 
launch on any test sortie without sufficient analysis of all previous sorties but this is for 
test efficiency reasons, as well as the more commonly discussed safety ones. 
 
This test programme has re-learned the classic lesson that numerical test data, must 
always be supplemented and qualified by cockpit obtained data, and by the opinion of a 
competent and current Test Pilot. 
 
 
FINANCIAL SUMMARY 
 
This paper is about low cost flight testing, and so it is appropriate to indicate the cost of 
this programme.  The two main researchers time isn‟t accounted here – Guy Gratton‟s 
time is released from a day job with the Natural Environment Research Council, whilst 
Mike Bromfield‟s is funded by the Thomas Gerald Gray Charitable Trust Research 
Scholarship Scheme.  However, the remainder can be accounted and provides an 
illustration of the costs of a test programme in light aeroplanes. 
 
No. Item Approx. Cost (US$ at 2010 rates) 
1 25hrs 35 mins flying time in 
rented aeroplanes 
4,500 
2 Handheld cockpit test 
equipment 
 150 
3 Cockpit mounted video 
recorder 
450 
4 Appareo GAU1000A Flight 
Data Recorder 
2,000 
5 Garmin 296 GPS 1,500 
6 47 hrs in the Sheffield 
University research simulator 
4,000 
 Total: 12,600 
 
 
There was additional use of simulators at Brunel University which were available to the 
research team free of charge, because this equipment was purchased for and primarily 
used for undergraduate teaching purposes. 
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